Conference Paper

Since 1990, when the American political scientist Joseph Nye elaborated the term of soft power for the first time (Nye, 1990), the concept has been hailed, criticized or neglected, but, in due time positioned itself as crucial component of a country’s foreign policy. Consecutive US administrations were the leading actor in the field, alongside the European Union with its gravity model of democratization (Emerson & Nouncheva, 2004). When it comes to applying soft power, the Russian Federation is a latecomer, regardless of the long, ideology-based record of its predecessor, the USSR. During the political, economic and financial crises of the past decade, the European Union was absorbed by internal deliberations, while the United States reoriented itself towards Asia. The freshly opened strategic vacuum in the Balkans was exploited by Moscow which approached the region with its own version of soft power, combined with political propaganda. However, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the proxy war in Ukraine, the Western Alliance (US and EU) returned to the Balkans with the aim of repositioning itself by confronting Russian influence. It could be argued that despite perceptions created in some sections of the western media, the redoubled Russian efforts in the Balkans have not succeeded in deposing the West from dominating the region. In the years ahead, Russia, most likely, will achieve little more than being seen as an obstructionist force, while the West will remain in the driving seat relying on its vast and diversified reservoir of soft power.