

The Election System of The Republic Of Macedonia - Current Dilemmas

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Abstract

Undoubtedly political theory does not have exclusivity in election-related debates, as this phenomenon is equally provocative to a wider range of subjects. This is not a coincidence because elections (apart from the referendum) are the only form available to citizens for direct participation in political life. Although elections presuppose competition on precisely defined rules of the game, however, it is usually after the election to open a discussion and to change the already established rules. This atmosphere, for a long time, is practicing law in our country. This, among other things, is due to the fact that the legitimacy of the government arises not only from the outcome of the elections, but also from the behavior of the key political forces during the elections, ie from their observance of the legally established procedure. Respect for the rules of the game results in a legitimate parliament and a legitimate political elite that present the will of the electorate. On the contrary, it entails dubiousness that is usually used by political entities in their daily calculations, which may, in certain circumstances, jeopardize the functioning of the political system.

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1. Introduction

Political theory does not have exclusivity in election-related debates, as this phenomenon is equally provocative to a wider range of subjects. This is not a coincidence because elections (apart from the referendum) are the only form available to citizens for direct participation in political life. Although elections presuppose competition on precisely defined rules of the game, however, it is usually after the election to open a discussion and to change the already established rules. This atmosphere, for a long time, is practicing law in our country. This, among other things, is due to the fact that the legitimacy of the government arises not only from the outcome of the elections, but also from the behavior of the key political forces during the elections, ie from their observance of the legally established procedure. Respect for the rules of the game results in a legitimate parliament and a legitimate political elite that present the will of the electorate. On the contrary, it entails dubiousness that is usually used by political entities in their daily calculations, which may, in certain circumstances, jeopardize the functioning of the political system.

Of course, the electoral systems are not only composed of election rules, but also include a certain political culture, as an environment in which the electoral process takes place. This raises some concerns about the stability and tradition of one's own order, as reducing elections to the act of "gaining power at any cost", even if they are irregular, has a devastating effect on a country's democracy and the political culture of its citizens. Therefore, elections, as a complex political act, are an indicator and catalyst of the type and degree of political socialization and political culture of the subjects in an environment. The extra-institutional plan, they are essential for creating a favorable psychological climate, political stability and community and de ntifikacija citizens with it, and the institutional political level, the result of the elections if they are free and direct, is the legitimate representative body.

What an electoral system will be like, what contents and functions it will have, primarily depends on the character of the political system and its peculiarities. However, the electoral system is not passive, performed a political category that unidirectional exhausted to the needs of a particular political system, but, he performed a retroactive impact on other segments and institutions of the political system, even if it slides gradu us in certain moments may be crucial in transforming politics and its institutions^[1]. Especially in a situation where politics is unstable and fragile, a relatively inadequately sized electoral system can be one of the factors generating the crisis. Therefore, the election rules need to pass the test of time, so that we can talk about the electoral system as a stable element of a democratic order. In this regard, of particular importance is the continued application of the election makes la, in several election cycles, one of the factors that influence the shaping of political culture and electoral behavior of political actors, how oh and on building a strategy for them tive election performance.

In any case, here it became a rule for election to speak only through the prism of the irregularity of the electoral process, and almost did not open competent discussion of system solutions in the Law on

Elections and their evaluation in terms of the effects that they have on two key goals that an electoral system should achieve, namely a stable government and a representative parliament. As, and in much debate on this issue, it usually comes down to the cross-party communication and calculation, not some serious discussions initiated in scientific circles. Unfortunately, throughout this period, the involvement of the scientific community is only a reaction to the debates between the parties, and not to more serious reflections of the qualified expert public that deals with this topic. [2]. Of course, this leaves room for confusing and flat interpretations of existing solutions and the creation of proposals that often correspond to a single party with daily party interests. Therefore, it is necessary to take a studious approach to possible changes and build a concept, for it, how they would operate in practice, which would be politically their implications of such changes (the composition of the government, as will be decisions in the assembly, implementation of Baden terov majority, etc.). Moreover, in the valorization of those changes, it is especially important where the ordinary citizen and his electoral will will be positioned. This is especially to avoid the reduction of the ordinary voter verifier party set these staffing priorities.

With ledejkji chronology of electoral reforms in the country, in which the word had the relevant political parties, it is evident that changes in the setup Horno legislation took place the majority voting system in two rounds by combining majoritarian elements of proportional of choice en system, and in exclusively proportionality is on. In fact, as opposed sends pushes the focus to be placed very enchanting political parties, most would have to think about the essence of democratic representation, and to concentrate on voter and his will. This aspect is the focus of this paper.

Democratic representation is particularly important, because if you see existing social cleavages (different lines polarizacii- religious, linguistic, ethical etc.) That exist in the country and their Political am co expression and positioning by political parties, more than clear that they, as exponents of those social differences, strive to achieve political articulation and representation in the Assembly. It is indisputable that this is only possible through the proportional electoral model, but which can be corrected or adapted to the democratic needs of the voter. After all, in conditions of the so-called deep divisions majority elections actually exacerbate centrifugal relations and have a disintegrating force (Nohlen, D. 90: 198). Obviously, in designing election solutions, the legislator cannot ignore the fact "with *cultural pluralism*" as a mark of the Macedonian state (Goati, V. 1991: 55). Therefore, for us, any other solution except proportional model would be inappropriate and would imply effects will amortize conflicts, but rather may have intensified.

2. Current debate on elections and reform and in R EPUBLIC M acedonia

Following the trend of changes in the election law davstvo here, notes that Mr. and sometimes this election cycle has not derailed the party debates to reform elections t process. Namely, at this point

except certain they minor interventions to change some provisions of the existing Electoral Code (regarding the financing of political parties, protection of the right to vote and the involvement of the SEC in the Voter's List), ongoing, open discussion and two new solutions that, by their nature, have implications for the final distribution of seats in parliament, and thus the formation of the government so and decision makers you. It is, on the one hand, the possibility Macedonian move sions (Diaspora) to c keys in the electoral process, on the other hand, offer additional meters and ndati for parties of smaller ethnic communities. These are questions that were a strong provocation for the already polarized party scene.

At the same time, in all these debates is obviously avoiding the "real you" themes that mark a step forward in the development of democracy in our country. In fact, one of those threads is and preferential voting, as the only realistic option for the democratization of Macedonian electoral system, which is unfortunately not proved "interesting" to any of the politician s parties. Logically, are placed great sh TION it: H and due to their indifference? Does that mean that no findings is one such opportunity or do not match First quo this decision, knowing what it implies (primarily for intra-party democracy, and "presentation" of staffing solutions to the test before the public) and in what position It became party these leaders, as opposed to distributors tion of power within the p and r Tiana. Most likely, it and real s reasons and the existence of tacit consensus, among all parties, this topic not to be opened and for such a possibility can not speak in public.

2.1. Additional seats for smaller community parties

The ability of citizens to influence the process of political decision-making has always been a key element in the valorization of ed is n order as democratic. This question certainly acquires a new connotation today when the notion of democracy can not be interpreted through the prism of the "will of the people". And endeavor to de ntifikuva and implantation me RTD "general will" is primarily just a theoretical issue related to a political concept, hence its understanding and operationalization depends on whether the focus of the political community is the people as a homogeneous group- or individual collectivity as an autonomous entity aware of its political subjectivity. In fact, here we locate the essential difference in the way in which individuals can operationalize their own political subjectivity. In this sense, the history of political thought to the conclusion, that did not exist a formula by which you can identify the will of the people, but that the list of possible interpretations is open and largely determined by the way it distributes and second power in a community. O what is a generally accepted standard of democracy today is, that any decision taken by the majority will be democratic only in how respected and minority groups or communities, or if it is the result of a broad consensus. Differences arise in the way assumptions are made to meet this commitment. After all,

the distinction between equality of access and equality of opportunity can be inferred from this, with the latter being the pivotal element of defining democracy today. (Hoffman , J . ; Graham , P . 2006: 72- 73)

Oci igledno form "winner takes with è" already does not meet the standards that are imposed by the modern concept of democracy and the functioning of the modern state . In this context, the topic of additional seats for the parties of the smaller ethnic communities in the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia can be actualized , as a way to redesign the paradigm of its composition.

Analyzing the electoral behavior of the voters in the Republic of Macedonia, it is noted that the interest of a particular ethnic community is the dominant axis of integration of interests in the political sphere, ie it still has a decisive influence in shaping the political views of citizens. Ana logno, the high polarization between the parties on the line of ethnic division is evident. Thus , the numerous polls, as well as the election results from the first elections in 1990 until today, make it possible to notice certain patterns of party preference characteristic of certain parts of the electoral body. Namely , since ethnicity, and it coincides religious, it is evident that the group surveyed Albanians of Muslim veroispove e , in most cases we prefer parties of their ethnic group. Thereby, significant changes are noticed within its own political bloc , if we compare the elections between different election cycles. In contrast, other smaller ethnic groups tend to vote not only for parties belonging to their ethnic or religious group, but also for a preference for political parties with a more pronounced civic orientation.

Exactly all these aspects are especially important in modeling a certain electoral system. Namely, the "electoral engineers" in "designing" more sophisticated forms of democracy, which would reflect the existing divisions and characteristics of a particular society, it is necessary to carefully combine the electoral dimensions that are available to them. Only in this way is it possible to model adequate forms of representation and influence of existing divisions. This approach directs society to develop the following four key capacities (Tronconi , F. 2006):

1. and institutionally absorb and resolve conflicts peacefully ;
2. to encourage cooperation across political party lines ;
3. to develop an inclusive agenda for joint action ;
4. i and stimulating civic th participation, as a proofreader policy that in January implemented through out the holders of power.

In fact, these are recommended decision-making processes and systemic functioning in heterogeneous societies, in order to ensure a broader consensus in decision-making.[\[31\]](#). In this context, by providing the status of legislative parties, the smaller communities are enabled to be active and decisive participants in the process of negotiation and exchange of opinions as the only accepted form of political action . The initial assumption is that institutional solutions that foster consensual rather than majority patterns of elite relations correlate with peaceful conflict resolution. It is important that consensus is seen as a strategy for managing conflict through cooperation and agreement between stakeholders.

Of course, interesting to discuss is whether all torn in a community have equal weight and whether the level of political culture, ie the discrepancy in the level of culture segment, we doveduvat questioned their cooperation. This indication is especially relevant for the Republic of Macedonia, given the character and nature of the divisions between its separate segments.

In principle, given that the Macedonian society defines itself as multiethnic, not binational, the need for the existing smaller ethnic communities, regardless of their number, to achieve their representation in the legislature, seems quite logical and natural. Here it must be noted, that the opportunity for such pretstavuvawe postoi i sega, no generally preku {iroki they predizborni koalicii so partii koi imaat pomasovna poddr {ka among voters, and that is often of correspondence and raat and ideological th preference of voters belonging to smaller ethnic communities, therefore, some of them "cumulatively" satisfy their electoral preference.

However, there is already talk of securing guaranteed seats for each community separately. Due to the fact that there are certain experiences in the countries in the region, it is advisable to consider such an opportunity in our country, but caution is needed, because this issue provokes numerous dilemmas and considerations. Undoubtedly, the problem is not only related to its normative dimension, ie it does not come down to guaranteeing the right to political association of the smaller ethnic communities, but has wider implications and presupposes awareness of the interest of the community and its functioning. Specifically, one of the reservations towards such an opportunity is that the minority parties, in a certain constellation of party regroupings, can oversize their own political position and with ultimatums, in the decision-making process, impose satisfaction of some of their unrealistic demands. However, their crucial role in certain situations when the parliamentary majority is put to the test is not excluded.[\[4\]](#). On the other hand, these parties also face the problem of democratization in their own party ranks. In fact, comparative experience shows that this is exactly the weakness of small parties, which represent the smaller communities in a society.

In any case what this issue actualized at this point is that it is a party of those minority communities, which, in many nastapuvat own elections, can not provide entry into parliament. This does not mean that there might remain for independent performance their is limited, but that any electoral system does not would the electric in addition to their proper representation. Namely, the fact that these communities are territorially dispersed in all regions (which they o not possible UVA earn tenure with independent performance), is reason enough to think about how to avoid their permanent minorizacija or minority position. The above remarks certainly would need o be considered when designing it possible legislative solutions. In doing so, it is advisable to pay attention to the following:

- The route choice behavior - ethnicity, must be seen as Mr. and unique model setup arable decision or questionable TVR day only representative of the community it has the exclusive right to represent the interests of sopstvanata ethnic group. Tokmu in this is the essence of the

dilemma , whether REPUBLIC Macedonia will develop in civil society or remain "trapped" in the existing ethnic collectivities .

- D Ali and how the decision fixed in advance to reserve certain seats for each of these smaller communities, is happily chosen , without taking into account what will be the real voice support for these places, ie how to measure the quota for each community and for each seat . With TP thus the parties will be placed in conditions of competition, which will have to fight for their electoral support .
- And a hundred should also include the mechanism of "minusiranje" of these reserved seats (either part or all of) the many representatives of the respective ethnic h and unit fail to get a seat within the 120 - seats (either the party of the specific ethnic community to be in coalition with another political party or as a candidate of another party , but with the appropriate ethnicity) .
- As mentioned already in the general context but in the context of the posting of party you lists of these parties should seriously consider introducing preferential then vote as a realistic option for expressing adherence to his ethnicity, but within one so-called wider civic list.
- O becomes an open question , how to summarize the voices of these communities (whether at national or at the level of districts, with one or two ballots as you keep the records in the voter lists, etc .).

The comparative review of certain experiences is an interesting indicator of the ways in which this issue has been resolved in some , for us , reference states (see Table 1) , as well as the possible effects of such a solution. (Bieber , F. 2003)

Country	Electoral system	Number of homes	Reserved seats	Threshold
BiH (2002)	PR	2	15 (5 each for Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats)	3%
BiH Federation (2002)	PR	2	Upper House (98 seats) reserved at least 4 for Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats; Lower House (58 seats), 17 Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats each and 7 others	3%
Republika Srpska (2002)	PR	2	Upper House (83) reserved seats at least Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats; Lower	3%

			House (28 seats) reserved for 8 seats each for Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats and 4 others	
Croatia (2002)	PR	1	Reserved seats (5-8)	5%
Kosovo (2001)	PR	1	Reserved seats (10 Serbs, 10 others)	
Macedonia (2002)	PR	1		
Montenegro (2002)	PR	1	Reserved places (3 Albanians)	3%
Serbia (2000)	PR	1		5%

Table no. 1

Obviously, possible different solutions may be through which you can operationalize such a commitment, and it is important to recognize and attend to the implications of their application. Thus, as indicative etc. in fact, stands the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany. Namely, the proportional system of Germany, for example, protects the "passive" suffrage of Danish minority parties. Although German Political parties are necessary to hold a AT threshold of 5% nationally or 3 direct votes to gain AT rights to participate in the distribution of mandates, the Danish minority has the right to be represented in Parliament, without to meet this requirement. So, their active suffrage is indistinguishable from their fellow - Germans, but their passive right is further protected and by not applied the legally threshold. This right of minority utilized only in one election cycle (1949).. Specifically, the voice of the Civil MP in Parliament was crucial in choosing the chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had received only one vote more than his opponent. After radio "accusations" that the Civil Minority MP was key in arbitrating the winner, the Danes decided that despite the undeniable commitment their minority rights to be protected, however, felt that no right as a minority to the majority to exercise power. Therefore, this ethnic group practically gave up this right. A similar situation is registered in Slovenia in 1996. When Italian and Hungarian messenger, a voice over, secured the victory of Janez Drnovsek. (Genero, D. 2004: 6-10)

On the other hand, the electoral systems of Romania and Slovenia further protect the "active" suffrage. Thus, the example, the well known Italian and Yugoslav minority in Slovenia, does not belong only to protect passive setup and handles right, but every member of these minorities also obtain additional vote. In addition to the regular ballot, the declared representatives of these two minorities can receive an additional (second) ballot for the election of a minority MP. In this way, the legislator considered that the danger of "pressure on minorities to choose" ghettoization (if they vote only for the list of their minority

candidates) or assimilation (if they decide to vote only for candidates on the regular lists) was avoided. Croatian electoral system, similar to the German, protects only passive suffrage rights of minorities living empowered to Croatia, that the voter has the right to two votes, but votes for party lists, which they are forced ghettoization or assimilation. This opinion is based on the fact that voters who are non-Croatian ethnic origin are kept separate electoral lists for radical that, those persons when accessing the voting , should at the very polling station to declare which of the ballots will be e their vote: whether for the list of minority candidates or for "ordinary" voter lists. Also, as a lack considered well in advance booked a fix is n number of seats for these parties, which practically discourages potential voters to vote for "their" candidates anyway because they have reserved their number of seats. In contrast, these voters are more motivated to vote for the other candidate lists, with which you will have a bigger stake in who will rule in Croatia in the next term.

Obviously, the comparative experiences are especially important in the analysis and creation of solutions through which the commitment for guaranteed presence of the political parties of the minority communities in the Republic of Macedonia would be operationalized. Only in this way will avoid the side effects of certain decisions that , even , be in opposite OST with established standards of democracy .

2.2. Voice of the Diaspora

There is no doubt the right of the Macedonian citizens, whether living in the country or not, to participate in national or in the presidential election. The problem, in fact , is how to provide conditions for these citizens to vote outside the borders of Macedonia. Proof that there is a certain trend of enabling voting abroad is the document prepared by IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) , according to which, out of 214 independent states and territories surveyed, more than 100 show some form of this form of voting. lasing. Broad this sends tics exist in Europe (40%) , but in other regions: Africa (21%), America (14%), Asia (16%) and Pacific (6%).

There are various world experiences on how the votes of the diaspora could be counted or transferred to mandates:

- the votes to be merged in one, national constituency ;
- the votes to flow into the existing regional constituencies, depending on what is the last residence of the emigrant before leaving the country ;
- the votes to be calculated only for the predetermined number of mandates in the Assembly , which will be filled by the diaspora .

There are only ten countries (see Table 2) in the world that have adopted the third model, ie provide reserved seats for expatriates. (Bartulac - Blanc , T. 2007: 16)

Country	Number of reserved seats	Total number of seats	Percentage of reserved seats	Comments
Algeria	8	389	2.0	

Angola	3	220	1.4	It has not been realized yet
Cape Verde Islands	6	72	8.3	3 IU with 2 places each, for America, Africa and Europe
Colombia	1	166	0.6	1 IU
Croatia	The number is not fixed, up to 14 seats	160 maximum		See comment in the text
Ecuador	6	130	4.6	
France	12	331	3.6	Vote only for the Senate, by voting of the electors (indirectly)
Italy	12	630	1.9	6 places for both homes
Mozambique	2	250	0.8	1 IU for Africa and 1 for the rest of the world
Panama	6	130	4.6	It has not been realized yet
Portugal	4	230	1.7	2 IUs after 2 terms if the voters are over 55,000, otherwise only after 1 term

Table B no. 2

It should also not be forgotten that to the extent that there is a small difference in vote support between the main candidates in the election race, it may be that these votes or mandates chosen by the diaspora are crucial (Bartulac - Blanc , T. 2007: 10) on which political entity will form the new government . In this sense , and experience of Croatia registered positive , and negative aspects of the practice of voting and right. The fact is that Croats living outside Croatia in general more often vote for the right HDZ party and thanks to their support HDZ failed several times to January form the government coalition in the state. Particularly indicative were the recent parliamentary elections, in which the voice of the BiH diaspora was again decisive (Table 3) .

Parliamentary elections in Croatia / election year	Mandates of the Diaspora / Total number of seats in the Parliament	According to parties
1995	12/127	HDZ
2000	6/151	HDZ
2003	4/152	HDZ
2007	5/153	HDZ

Table no. 3

In Croatia, in fact, the possibility that persons residing abroad to vote, refers to two categories of citizens: (1) those living abroad on election day, but have residence in Croatia; and (2) those living abroad but not residing in Croatia. The first group vote for their constituency, but by Mr. tion and the second group has its own "constituency for Diaspora" for voice.

Of course, this possibility presupposes precise records and established criteria for distinguishing these two categories of citizens. This is especially important to note, because the problem with the registration of citizens who really still live in the Republic of Macedonia, as opposed to those who live abroad and hold citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, complicates the control of regular voting, despite efforts for more appropriate records^[5]. Therefore, always linger t fugue Paired from a political party (usually the one who is in opposition at that moment or that loses the election) that manipulate the votes Witte these voters and fictitious stuffing ballot boxes. Therefore, you really need *a credible evidence that will clear the domestic electoral register of people who are not currently living in the country and at the same time they had the democratic right of expatriates to vote in diplomatic and consular offices in the countries where they, at the moment pre with tojuvat*. It is a document that is the official register of registered voters for specific constituencies and which determines whether the citizen will be able to exercise his right to vote or not.

Undoubtedly in considering whether to vote diaspora here, it is necessary, first, to distinguish and Russ h Istana some reasonable doubt:

- co person voter will have the status "temporary o c edge en abroad", ie, who is the timeframe in which the status of "temporary" would pre passed in the "permanent" (eg Britain which time this limited to 15 years so that in SLE that period these people lose the right to vote) or so k it will be bags earmarked limited. Specifically, anyone who holds a Macedonian passport, regardless of whether they have ever been to the Republic of Macedonia or plans to return, simply has the right to vote;
- whether there will be different voter lists in our embassies. A list to refer to the people so that they would vote for the constituencies where they have residence and other than would have covered those who do not have residence in Macedonia and would vote for reserved seats for that purpose;
- what will be the status of a voter and those staying abroad due to work responsibilities;
- how will the control mechanism be established for those persons who live in the sitting states of the Republic of Macedonia and there is a danger (some of them) to abuse this right by voting twice: on the day of the elections in Macedonia and on the voting day in the country in which reside;
- Will there be a correct record of those persons who have residence in the Republic and who would have voted abroad in ESPA la at their minus iranje of voter lists that favor empowered the state

for each district separately . A litigation is the surest way to prevent abuses of the voices of these people or manipulation by enabling multiple voting ;

- whether the Republic of Macedonia has sufficient resources and capacities to respond appropriately to such a task and to ensure equality and secrecy of the vote . So , what is the capacity of the state to manage the election process in all phases of its realization ;
- whether these persons will be able to vote in a referendum in the future ;
- in the end, the question arises , how much and whether it is profitable for only three seats (each of the three seats corresponds to one of the continents where our emigrants live: America, Europe and Australia) in the Assembly to take such an undertaking that engages numerous both human and material resources .

Obviously , the implementation of such a solution is not simple and and requires the creation of solutions to clear all the above uncertainties. To this proposal the Government some reservation expressed and the Venice Commission , which assessed that the Republic of Macedonia has no administrative, infrastructure and budgetary capacity to organize voting outside the borders. Namely, with its limited number of diplomatic missions - only 45, the country puts in an unequal position all those citizens who live in countries where there is no diplomatic-consular mission , or their places of residence are physically very far from that mission, for to be able to exercise their right to vote without hindrance. Therefore , should be developed m poured the possibility of voting by mail (as the example of Sweden) or a protected voting on the Internet. It is recommended to provide the Electoral i Akon hic potential voters to be able to announce their wish to vote in advance, so that citizens will be minusiran of birth polling you lists that apply to constituencies in the Republic of Macedonia. In this way, possible fraud and abuse of the voter lists would be prevented . In order to coordinate the efforts, a special working body has been established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose task is to review the possibilities for the realization of this idea.

At the moment, it is still not possible to determine the final number of persons who are Macedonian citizens and who express a desire to vote. Only in that case (if the number is known) we will have an orientation picture of the number and dispersion of our citizens around the world and we will be able to make a clear financial construction for the whole project. At the moment, the Agency for Emigrants is taking data from the competent institutions across the oceanic and European countries in which Macedonian emigrants are registered, according to which, Macedonia has about 330,000 emigrants, but still there is no precise record of how many of them have Macedonian citizenship and how many of them would like to vote. On the other hand, according to the voter lists from the last parliamentary elections in our country, about 60,000 voters who have been abroad for less than 1 year were registered with an asterisk.

2.3 Preferential voting

In accordance with current legislation, to us, the voter votes for one of the party lists of candidates without the opportunity to express preferenciska and Mr. tervencija on the order of candidates determined by the parties. The fact that the list is fixed, ie voters can not intervene in it, is just a confirmation of the high degree of control that leaders have over the ranking of party colleagues - candidates on the ballots. Namely, the party leaders are the ones who control the nomination, which means that within the close party leadership it is decided which of the party members will be given the "honor" to be candidates in the elections. So, the status of "candidate" is conditional or privileged with the blessing of the party leadership. At the same time, the party leaders determine the order in the list, and the voters cannot influence that order. O t here, voters choose between parties rather than between candidates. This minimizes the value of the candidate's personal reputation. In these cases the so-called fixed voting party reputation has a much higher value (Carey, J.M. and Shugart, M. 1993: 416-420), ie it does not encourage the engagement of candidates in their own promotion.

Interestingly, the promotion of regional th list allows party leaders to circumventing the immediate test of its popularity. In fact, they themselves prefer to be nominated as list holders, which allows them, regardless of the election outcome, to make their entry into parliament certain (Taagepera, R. 1995: 329).

However, sends Tikal in older democracies of Western Europe and new breakthroughs in the democratization of political parties and their opening to the voters, which occurred in the litigation and the countries of Middle and Eastern Europe, it should be b coming neglected o in Republic of Macedonia. To illustrate: Western European countries such as Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Austria and Sweden provide movable (preferential) proportional lists where the voter still has autonomy in voting for his / her preferred candidate within the party he / she is voting for. A similar method, which allows even combining voter preferences from different party lists (called panasage), is used in Switzerland and Luxembourg. Another combined system that is also proportional, but which has a clear personalized method of counting votes, also has Ireland (Single Transferable Vote), and that model is also applied in Estonia. Even those countries that remained on the solution of rigid party lists, however, other solutions (like Germany with a combined electoral system, or Israel with extensive involvement of citizens in the stage of nomination and ranking of candidates in the election phase) provided St. O 's c future compensation for the lack of democracy from the rigid party list. Unfortunately, we are still not even thinking about this type of change, which of course wil is put in a different position Patricia Kittel candidates. The impression is that, maybe this solution can help the parties to get out of the crisis that they have been facing for a long time, and at the same time, maybe a bigger electoral turnout of the citizens would be encouraged again. Specifically in the Republic of Macedonia for a long time in the polls [\[6\] A](#) significant proportion of respondents said they would abstain in the event of an election

(around 25% nationally) or that they "did not know" which political party they would vote for (again around 25%). In summary, such a rate could potentially jeopardize the legitimacy of the elected representatives is, if the election is participating such a large percentage of voters.

The recommendation is, if there is a will to introduce such changes in the future, to do so initially for the next local elections, where the logic of such a direct representation because of the knowledge of candidates by voters would give positive results. Only later, after this initial test, could this principle be applied to party lists at the national level.

3. Conclusion

If the Republic of Macedonia wants to be a stable democratic state, it is necessary to implement rules that will function in the long run and will create a more stable systemic milieu in which political entities will build an appropriate strategy of action, but also an appropriate political culture. In such conditions, even those political forces that are "unjustified" with some of the elements of the electoral system, gradually adapt by building a strategy that minimizes the side effects that certainly reduce the manifested frustrations. Therefore, it is recommended to be careful and gradual in the changes, i.e. dose adjustments of the existing system, and not to radically change the principles of representation.

The initiative to find systemic solutions to enable the representation of the smaller ethnic communities and the settlers is indisputable. However, these issues are very complex, and in order to find correct and solid solutions, it is necessary to accurately and in detail operationalize the solutions that will be contained in the Law. Otherwise, one can fall into the trap of flatness and improvisation and caricature the good intentions of the legislator. Exactly after radical such sensitivity to this issue are necessary scientific elaborations of deriving specific mechanisms that will achieve the expected effect.

At the same time, when modeling the concrete solutions for the representation of the smaller ethnic communities, a balance should be taken between the need for the community to be represented, versus the real - with given votes - the earned (deserved) place, as an expression of the real support given. In no case should the solution further "crush" and destroy the "civic" element, which fortunately still exists in Macedonian society, and should continue to be given a chance to develop.

As for the voting of the emigrants with citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, a crucial step in this direction is the final provision of a real and valid voter list, because from the records of that document depends who, where and how will vote.

Finally, further maturation of the political and electoral system through the introduction of preferential voting for proportional lists is particularly recommended. It is expected that this change will be positive so the arrows especially for citizens and political parties finally have to face the democratic

processes , primarily within their own parties. Further insistence on closed lists (for whatever reason) is merely evidence that parties are still putting their own interests first, alienating the voter from the feeling that he or she is actually participating in the election process.

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